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raised their hands during question periods, how often 
each gender was called on, and other information that 
would track patterns of behavior consistent with gender-
based discrimination during question periods. The past 
decade had transformed my friend into someone who felt 
a pressing need to do something about the environment 
for underrepresented groups in philosophy of science. My 
friend and I are both still (hopefully) early in our careers, 
and the changes we have both undergone since beginning 
graduate school give me hope to imagine what we might 
find, and what we might create, at philosophy conferences 
thirty or forty years from now. 
Although my term as a co-chair of the Women’s Caucus 
has ended, I hope that as the Caucus continues to grow 
and evolve, it will make more contact with broader 
efforts to diversify philosophy in the APA as well. None 
of the initiatives discussed here were targeted solely 
at improving the climate for women in philosophy of 
science. The Women’s Caucus has some of those initiatives 
too. However, the more obviously intersectional efforts 
discussed here have played a significant part in creating 
a PSA meeting with a climate that is more welcoming to 
a wider net, more generally. There are more women and 
more people of color coming to meetings, as well as 
more accommodations available for people with children 
and people with special needs. With a little luck and a lot 
of effort, and with the continued support of a governing 
board that has chosen to recognize and prioritize the need 
for coordinated efforts to improve diversity in the PSA, I can 
only hope the situation will continue to improve. It would 
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Over the past forty years, philosophical discussions of rape 
have focused on two sometimes-overlapping aims. With 
key insights about power and social structure, feminist 
social and political theorists (e.g., Susan Brownmiller, 
Carole Pateman, Claudia Card, Ann Cahill) have sought to 
produce more adequate accounts of the causes, social 
functions, and lived effects of rape and to articulate 
viable avenues for resistance and societal transformation. 
Meanwhile, moral and legal philosophers—both those who 
explicitly adopt feminist commitments (e.g., Susan Estrich, 
Lois Pineau, Keith Burgess-Jackson, Jean Hampton, Joan 
McGregor) and those who don’t (e.g., David Archard, Alan 
Wertheimer, Donald Dripps)—have asked a different set 
of questions: What is the wrong of rape? How can legal 
definitions reflect this wrong? How ought culpability to be 
determined? 
With What Is Rape? Hilkje Hänel enters the debate from a 
refreshingly new angle, leveraging contemporary critical 
theory and social ontology to analyze how the phenomenon 
of rape is conceptualized, upstream from the normative 
and definitional concerns of moral and legal theory. She 
expands the project of feminist structural critique to look 
beyond rape’s causes and effects to the question of how 
the conceptualization of “rape” is itself shaped by power 
relations and socially available epistemic resources. Her 
careful analysis produces a convincing social theory of how 
rape fits into sexist ideology and a rigorous, constructive 
account of how rape ought to be conceptualized—not only 
to reflect the complexity of the phenomenon but also to 
account for “rape” as a concept susceptible to ideological 
distortion. 
While the category of rape is widely contested in legal and 
popular discourses, Hänel diagnoses a common, often 
implicit working understanding of rape shaped by defective 
beliefs and judgments colloquially known as “rape myths.” 
Rape myths are a particular kind of cultural narrative 
that “shape our understandings of sexual activities and 
sexualized violence,” particularly in ways that “legitimize 
male entitlement to a female body” (35). Rape myths serve 
both explanatory and justificatory functions in shaping 
attitudes and interpretations of sex; in other words, they 
shape both how people interpret the factual events of a 
sexual encounter (e.g., “it wasn’t really rape”) and how they 
apportion blame for harms (e.g., “she/I was asking for it”). 
It is characteristic of rape myths that they are generally 
false but widely held either implicitly or explicitly to be true 
and that they circulate in both “everyday depictions and 
symbols” and by means of “everyday language practices” 
(44–45). Given their ready-to-hand cultural accessibility, 
Hänel argues that the distortionary effects of rape myths 
are especially great when they stand in as “indicator 
properties” to help us interpret situations where other 
evidence or information is lacking or where alternative 
explanations appear less salient. 
Hänel argues that despite increasing institutional uptake of 
more adequate formal definitions of rape (replacing force 
with lack of consent, recognizing marital rape, etc.) the 
pervasive influence of rape myths fuels a dominant working 
understanding of rape that privileges aggravated stranger 
rape as the paradigm case, thereby failing to track the 
wide range of phenomena—date rape, acquaintance rape, 
war rape, rape in prisons, etc.—that ought to be included 
in the category. This descriptive failure of the concept 
has significant normative effects in that the inadequate 
conceptualization of rape hinders victims’ abilities to make 
experiences intelligible to themselves and to others. Even 
when formal definitions of rape evolve, the influence 
of rape myths on the dominant working understanding 
can produce an “institutional mismatch” between such 
definitions and their application. Victims’ experiences are 
read as “not really rape” if they don’t match the dominant 
working understanding, which undermines victims’ 
ability both to gain private support and to be believed by 
institutional gatekeepers of justice. 
Hänel argues, following Sally Haslanger (2012), that the 
injustices stemming from the failure of the concept to 
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track reality can and ought to be ameliorated by enhancing 
the descriptive power of the concept in politically useful 
ways. However, rather than simply pursue a more refined 
definition of rape—the project of much feminist moral 
and legal theory—Hänel argues for a reconsideration 
of the conceptual architecture used to understand the 
phenomenon. To respond to the distortions of rape myths, 
she develops a methodology she calls emancipatory 
amelioration, which builds on Haslanger’s conceptual 
amelioration by formulating a concept of rape that is not 
only more descriptively adequate but also “fruitful for 
overcoming the de facto distorted conceptions of the 
concept and the equally problematic usage of the term” (24). 
This project requires two steps: (a) a systematic social theory 
that locates the phenomenon and its conceptualization 
within social structures, and (b) a reformulation of the 
concept to better capture the phenomenon and to become 
more resistant to the distortions that characterize the status 
quo. 
Hänel’s social theory identifies rape as a social practice 
(in the technical sense) within Haslanger’s (2017) detailed 
conceptual map of social structures. With case studies and 
a careful attentiveness to debates in social philosophy, 
Hänel argues that rape can be described as an accepted
social practice within the social structure because many 
of its forms are persistently misrepresented and justified 
according to available schemas (namely, rape myths), and 
because institutional responses distribute resources to 
perpetrators of rape (e.g., the ability to get away with it) 
while denying resources, including testimonial credibility, 
from victims. 
Hänel adopts insights from well-established feminist 
critiques, but she also adds complexity to the classic 
argument that rape is a feature of patriarchal social control. 
She argues that the social practice of rape and the way it 
is popularly conceptualized cannot be understood without 
examining the sexist ideology—beliefs, attitudes, and 
practices—of which it is a part. Drawing omnivorously 
from Haslanger (2017), Barbara Fields (1990), Tommie 
Shelby (2003), and the Frankfurt School (Geuss 1981), she 
develops a nuanced view of how different social groups are 
susceptible to the epistemic distortions that mask rape’s 
injustice. Locating rape within an ideology has the benefit 
of acknowledging the many social functions of rape beyond 
the unidirectional domination of women by men (e.g., 
destruction of communities in war, enforcement of white 
supremacy), which helps explain why women are not the 
only targets of rape and men are not alone in reproducing 
rape myths. All social groups can be located within the 
ideology, and each plays a role in its perpetuation. Crucially, 
the ideology explanation of rape also lends itself to the 
tools of immanent critique, suggesting that contradictions 
emerge within the social structure to create possibilities for 
resistance from within. 
How should rape be conceptualized given its vulnerability 
to distortion within a sexist ideology? Rather than settle the 
contested conceptualization of rape with a definition based 
on necessary and sufficient essential characteristics, Hänel 
proposes that rape be understood as a “cluster concept,” 
with disjunctively, rather than conjunctively, necessary 
criteria. (She grounds the theory of cluster concepts with 
an extensive discussion of Wittgenstein’s (1997[1965]) 
concept of “family resemblance” as a tool for describing 
social phenomena.) The ten salient criteria she selects for 
the concept of rape are drawn from empirical observation 
and social theory and articulated through a wide range of 
case studies. They include sexual activity, violence, means 
of physical coercion, means of psychological coercion, lack 
of consent, context of social vulnerability, and others. 
Hänel astutely recognizes, however, that these criteria are 
not binary features cleanly present or absent in particular 
cases. Rather, they are each time actualized in varying 
degrees, which motivates Hänel to add a further dimension 
of depth to her cluster concept. This is what she calls a 
“core” to the cluster, where an event that has many criteria 
actualized to the greatest degree is closer to the core—and 
therefore most clearly rape—while an event that has few or 
no criteria to a high degree and others to a low degree will 
be further from the core. In the latter case, an event may 
still appropriately fall under the category of rape, but it may 
also be more adequately included under a neighboring 
concept, such as another form of sexual mistreatment (e.g., 
sexual harassment) or a form of morally permissible sex 
(e.g., high-risk consensual sex). 
Hänel’s approach brings several advantages. By examining 
the concept of rape apart from its juridical uses, she avoids 
drawing a sharp line between rape and not-rape, which in 
turn allows examination of how grey areas can be present 
not only within rape but also between rape and neighboring 
concepts. This appreciation for grey areas is also well-served 
by the variability of degree she builds into each criterion— 
an ambitious solution to the problem of conceptualizing 
the multifaceted character of rape, even if the complexity 
of the solution at times exceeds the metaphors offered to 
aid the reader’s visualization. This approach leaves open 
substantially more space for discussion and contestation 
of the concept of rape, allowing a more reflexive stance 
toward genuine ambiguity and toward shifts in intuitions, 
such as those that come about in response to survivor 
movements like #MeToo. 
Hänel’s model views the “consent” criterion, for example, 
as always actualized in degrees, which enables the 
significance of an ambiguous expression of consent to 
be evaluated within a wider consideration of the features 
and context of an encounter. While standard philosophical 
discussions of consent acknowledge that context can 
affect consent’s “moral validity,” Hänel avoids defining 
rape according to a lack of morally valid consent alone. By 
taking into account a wider range of features within a given 
encounter, she seeks to weaken the potential power of 
rape myths over how consent is understood and evaluated. 
Here, however, her discussion would be strengthened and 
clarified by a more detailed explanation of how her cluster 
account departs from standard definitions of rape according 
to valid consent. Hänel allows that the criteria she identifies 
might be present in varying degrees in any particular rape, 
but it is not self-evident how she would respond to the 
argument that some criteria are simply more important 
to determining whether something is rape—namely, non-
consent and sexual penetration of any kind. 
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As methodology, Hänel’s approach to rape as a normative 
core-cluster concept can be applied to other social 
phenomena characterized by grey areas, ideological 
obscurations, and interference from neighboring concepts. 
(In footnotes she draws interesting parallels with critical 
analyses of race and racism.) She usefully reminds us of the 
need for concepts to accommodate shifting social realities, 
such as changing cultural norms and practices, and to allow 
productive contestation to continue. While legal scholars 
have work to do to figure out whether this flexibility can 
influence the law—Hänel argues that it can indirectly— 
critical theory and activist practice will benefit immediately 
from the move to decouple a concept’s adequacy from its 
authority to resolve all contestation. 
The book ends with a return to common normative 
questions, exploring the implications of Hänel’s account for 
holding perpetrators responsible and for enacting solidarity 
with accusers. Specifically, Hänel considers the problems 
posed by a “cognitive deficit” (i.e., ignorance-based) 
interpretation of the ideological distortions surrounding 
rape. If ideological distortion is straightforwardly a category 
of ignorance, locating rape within a pervasive ideology might 
be taken to give perpetrators an excuse for their actions 
(i.e., because they act out of ignorance) and to undermine 
the epistemic authority of victims’ testimony. Hänel takes 
a generous approach to perpetrator ignorance, gesturing 
toward a model of accountability and restorative justice 
that can “adequately and productively confront ideological 
beliefs and result in a learning process,” even if it softens 
blame toward perpetrators whose social positions within 
the ideology (e.g., as cis-males) encourage ignorance as to 
the harmfulness of their actions (205). Moral philosophers 
steeped in debates about the nature of responsibility will 
probably have qualms with Hänel’s specific disaggregation 
of blameworthiness from accountability, but they would 
do well to remember that her proposal is political—what is 
to be done?—rather than a metaethical claim about moral 
responsibility as such. 
For responding to victims, Hänel prescribes solidarity 
that affirms the validity of victims’ subjective experiences 
and recognizes that, due to their position within a sexist 
ideology, they are likely to suffer hermeneutical injustice 
as well as testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007). However, 
she stops short of attributing to victims epistemic privilege 
to wholly define the truth of what took place and its 
appropriate moral interpretation. Her position is that victims 
ought to be recognized as full epistemic authorities on their 
experiences of harm, but the questions of what objectively 
happened and whether an encounter should be defined as 
rape often require further interpretation. This argument is 
a close neighbor to Linda Martín Alcoff’s argument in Rape 
and Resistance (2018)—published when What Is Rape? 
had already gone to press—and it could be revisited and 
strengthened in light of Alcoff’s insights. Hänel’s argument 
would benefit from Alcoff’s point that experiences must 
also be interpreted—empowerment and solidarity require 
enhancing survivors’ epistemic resources—and from 
Alcoff’s claim that we can recognize epistemic privilege of 
survivors without granting absolute epistemic authority. On 
balance, Hänel’s prescriptions in the final chapter reflect a 
laudable commitment to hold the emancipatory aspect of 
her project accountable to feminist activism, but her claims 
will require a more sustained treatment—perhaps in her 
next book?—to satisfy both philosophers and activists who 
focus on these particular issues. 
The only true weak point in this ambitious book is the 
introduction, which doesn’t do justice to the breadth 
or depth of the project and could do more to set up the 
analysis that follows. In particular, the introduction could 
have provided more transparency regarding the operative 
concept of rape that undergirds Hänel’s conceptual 
critique; the basic commitments she names are only 
peripherally connected to the primary argument of the 
first two chapters. Moving some of the methodological 
points forward from chapter three could have grounded 
the critique of standard conceptualizations of rape, making 
the argument more convincing by acknowledging that the 
author’s own social position shapes her critical intuitions 
about the concept (Cf. Alcoff 2018). 
Still, Hänel’s arguments throughout What Is Rape? are 
characterized by fine-grained distinctions and careful 
attention to how concepts are produced and used in social 
reality. Her writing is paced for clarity and marked by 
abundant signposting. Perhaps the most widely accessible 
contribution for a general audience will be Hänel’s insightful 
account of the nature and function of rape myths. However, 
specialists in social philosophy will also benefit from her 
methodological innovation for analyzing ambiguous and 
complex social phenomena. The nuance and flexibility 
of her approach to the topic of rape is welcome, and its 
importance will only increase as popular intuitions about 
rape continue to shift and as prevailing sexual values and 
practices across societies continue to be questioned. 
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Debating Pornography 
A. Altman and L. Watson (Oxford University Press, 2018). 
Reviewed by Mari Mikkola 
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This book is part of OUP’s Debating Ethics-Series, where 
authors defend opposing views on pressing ethical, 
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